I'm interested in moral philosophy broadly construed, from metaethics to applied ethics. My dissertation defended Consequentialism against character-based objections, e.g. that the consequentialist agent would treat people as mere means, as fungible "receptacles of value". In other work I have defended non-naturalist moral realism, and explored its relation to anti-physicalism in the philosophy of mind. While at Penn, I will be working on health policy and the ethics of allocating scare medical resources.
'Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive', forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly.
'Knowing What Matters', forthcoming in P. Singer (ed.), Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
'Mind-Body Meets Metaethics: A Moral Concept Strategy' forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
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